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Abstract: This article examines Jeremy Waldron’s concept of the ‘circumstances of politics’ (CoP), which 
he describes as the felt need for a common decision in the face of disagreement. Waldron uses the CoP to 
detach certain issues surrounding civic virtue and institutional design from questions about substantive 
principles like justice, human rights etc.. While emphasis is often placed on the fact of disagreement, I argue 
that the other aspect of the CoP, the need for collective action, is in fact the more fundamental. Waldron’s 
arguments rely on an understanding that there is expressive value in citizens affirming commitment to the 
political community and on an awareness of how the nature of politics as public collective action is 
structured by the constitutional architecture. I argue that a lopsided focus on disagreement threatens to 
obscure the fact the political sphere is itself a fragile achievement that is in need of continual support. 
 
Jeremy Waldron has argued that contemporary political philosophy fails to take adequate account 
of what he calls the ‘circumstances of politics’ (CoP). The CoP consists of two facts which 
characterize modern societies, namely (i) that citizens experience ‘the felt need… for a common 
framework or decision or course of action’, notwithstanding (ii) the prevalence of ‘disagreement 
about what that framework, decision, or action should be’.1 Waldron’s claim is more significant 
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than it might appear at first glance. He has not merely pointed to a failure of political philosophy 
to address this kind of disagreement, as one might lament a lack of attention to environmental 
issues or the rights of non-human animals. Nor is he simply making the empirical claim that one 
cannot expect disagreement to disappear. He is making a claim about the nature of politics itself. 
‘The prospect of persisting disagreement’, he says, is ‘one of the elementary conditions of modern 
politics’, such that ‘[n]othing we can say about politics makes much sense if we proceed without 
taking this condition into account.’2 
Waldron has referred to the CoP in a variety of arguments,3 which have given rise to lively 
debates,4 yet little attention has been paid to his more general claim. A partial exception is perhaps 
to be found in the ‘political realist’ school, some of whom have looked to enlist the CoP for their 
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cause,5 yet approval for Waldron’s idea has not yet been accompanied by close analysis of his 
arguments. I find this omission curious, since, if the twin facts of the CoP are indeed ‘the 
elementary conditions of modern politics’, then this represents an important philosophical 
discovery. This article looks to remedy this gap, directing critical attention squarely on the CoP. 
In particular, while discussion of the CoP in the literature has concentrated on the fact of 
disagreement (as, at times, has Waldron himself), I shall argue that the other fact, the felt need for 
a common course of action, is actually the more fundamental. This has an important consequence: 
lopsided focus on disagreement might suggest a thin, instrumental conception of politics, whereas 
appreciation of the significance of collective action points us towards a richer understanding of 
what politics is, why it is valuable and how it might be protected. 
I start (I) by setting out the basic role of the CoP, which is to draw a distinction between 
‘substantive’ political values (like justice and human rights) and those values that are the subject-
matter of Waldron’s ‘political political theory’ (such as civility, loyal opposition and the rule of 
law) on the other. The crucial claim is, I suggest, that the challenge of enabling citizens to view 
themselves as members of a self-governing political community requires substantive views to be 
set to one side when considering issues concerning political disagreement. I then (II) examine a 
question that Waldron neglects: what does it mean for a disagreement to be political? My answer 
is that political disagreements are inherently public, that is, they are disagreements about what 
actions should be taken collectively in relation to public affairs, and are widely understood as such. 
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The very capacity to conceive of conflicts in political terms requires a shared understanding of 
‘publicness’, and is thus a significant achievement. This must be borne in mind when thinking 
about institutional design, since political institutions are not simply decision-making mechanisms: 
they play a crucial role in shaping the way in which citizens understand the political sphere, and 
the political community. 
I then look in more detail at some of the particular uses that Waldron makes of the CoP, 
focusing on the authority of law (III), civility and loyal opposition (IV), the so-called ‘dignity’ of 
legislation (V) and judicial review (VI). I argue that Waldron relies on two important ideas: firstly, 
that there is expressive value in affirming a commitment to the political community; and secondly, 
that the nature of politics as public collective action is structured by the constitutional architecture. 
These ideas are, however, overlooked in his ‘core case’ against judicial review, resulting in a 
disappointingly thin line of reasoning (grounded on a majoritarian conception of democracy), 
which fails to do justice to the insights he presents elsewhere. 
I conclude (VII) by suggesting that a fuller understanding would see the CoP not merely as a 
predicament to be managed, but as the defining characteristics of the political condition, and, as 
such, something worthy of protection. This is particularly pertinent at a time in which the political 
condition finds itself under threat from two directions, challenged by neoliberalism on one side 
and populism on the other. We must recognize the potential of the expressive value of political 
virtues, practices and institutions to buttress and perhaps even rejuvenate the shared sense that 
certain matters are of common concern and are the fitting subject of public contestation and debate. 
I. The Basic Role of the Circumstances of Politics 
 
 
The basic role of the CoP is to detach certain political issues, particularly those concerning 
constitutional design and civic obligation, from substantive questions of political morality (justice, 
human rights, etc.). The CoP tells us that, when determining how a political constitution ought to 
be structured, or the duties citizens owe one another, we should bracket our substantive political 
views and seek to exercise the ‘distinctively political virtues’.6 The idea is not that a highly-attuned 
sense of civic virtue or well-designed constitution will cause our substantive disagreements to 
dissolve, but that bracketing those disagreements will allow the polity to be understood as a project 
of collective self-government notwithstanding the persistence of political division. 
Waldron draws an analogy with the well-known idea of the ‘circumstances of justice’, a 
set of facts which certain philosophers have argued must be presupposed by any theory of justice.7 
A typical list would include vulnerability; moderate scarcity of resources; plurality of conceptions 
of the good; shortcomings of knowledge; and mutual disinterest or limited altruism. Absent these 
conditions, the argument goes, justice would be neither necessary nor possible (if resources were 
unlimited, the idea of a fair distribution would be meaningless). Theorists who adopt this idea 
believe that, whatever idealizations a conception of justice might employ, it cannot abstract away 
from these circumstances. Waldron makes a parallel claim for the CoP: ‘whatever else we wish 
away in political philosophy, we should not wish away the fact that we find ourselves living and 
                                                          
6 See note 13. 
7 See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3.2.2; David 
Hume, “An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,” in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding 
and Concerning the Principles Of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), section iii; John Rawls, A 
Theory Of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), §22. 
 
 
acting alongside many with whom there is little prospect of our sharing a view about justice, rights 
or political morality’.8 
The circumstances of justice delineates the scope of justice, within which other virtues may 
have to be set to one side. For example, Hume uses the circumstances of justice to distinguish the 
‘artificial’ virtue of justice from the ‘natural’ virtue of benevolence.9 The natural concern that 
people have for others, he claims, is too weak a sentiment to be able to undergird the kind of mutual 
trust required to maintain a large-scale society.  The fact of limited altruism directs us to abandon 
hope of establishing a polity (or political community – I use these terms synonymously) in which 
citizens bear the kind of regard towards one another that they hold towards friends and family. The 
inclusion of limited altruism in Hume’s circumstances of justice thus establishes that, within its 
proper scope, justice requires us to set benevolent feelings to one side. In Rawls’ account 
reasonable pluralism and mutual disinterest play a similar role. For Rawls, acceptance of these 
facts demands that principles of justice be ‘freestanding’ from the general conceptions of morality 
that individuals accept in their personal lives.10 So despite the enormous differences between their 
theories, both Hume and Rawls use the circumstances of justice to stipulate that certain kinds of 
considerations should be set aside when determining principles by which society as a whole is to 
be governed. 
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Waldron’s CoP take this thought a step further. Distinguishing between ‘(i) theorizing 
about justice (and rights and the common good etc.), and (ii) theorizing about politics’,11 Waldron 
argues that we should set aside our views about the former when engaging in the latter. By 
‘theorizing about politics’ he means what he has labelled ‘political political theory’: theory that 
examines ‘the way our political institutions house and frame our disagreements about social ideals 
and orchestrate what is done about whatever aims we can settle on’.12 Such issues engage ‘the 
distinctively political virtues, such as civility, the toleration of dissent, the practice of loyal 
opposition, and… the rule of law’.13 Just as the circumstances of justice direct us to set 
considerations of benevolence and personal morality aside when determining what justice requires, 
so the CoP demand that we set substantive views about justice, rights, etc. to one side when 
considering matters concerning political institutions, political authority and our treatment of our 
political opponents.14 
The most straightforward illustration of this argument comes in Waldron’s critique of 
‘rights instrumentalism’ – the view that, when choosing a decision-making procedure, we should 
select whichever is most likely to reach the correct decision.15 Charles Beitz had claimed that the 
argument from political equality to majority voting rests on ‘an implausibly narrow understanding 
                                                          
11 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 3. 
12 Jeremy Waldron, “Political Political Theory,” in Political Political Theory, 6. 
13 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 102. 
14 This is not to say that substantive views about justice (etc.) are irrelevant in political political theory. 
People who hold certain theories of justice (particularly non-liberal theories) might be led to reject ideals 
such as civility, toleration and so on, and will thus not accept that they ought to bracket their substantive 
conception of justice when considering constitutional issues. This is directly parallel to Rawls’ claim that 
those who hold ‘unreasonable’ comprehensive doctrines will be unable to accept a political conception of 
justice (see Rawls, Political Liberalism, Lecture II, §3). 
15 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 252-4. 
 
 
of the more basic principle, from which substantive concerns… have been excluded’.16 Waldron’s 
response is that, while there is a sense in which equal respect for persons requires sensitivity to 
substantive outputs, ‘this broad notion of respect is unusable in society’s name in the 
circumstances of politics’.17 We need a decision-procedure precisely because we disagree about 
what counts as a respectful outcome, and so anything that refers us back to the issue of substance 
‘would reproduce not resolve the decision-problem in front of us’.18 Rights-instrumentalism is 
‘question-begging’; it ‘presupposes our possession of the truth about rights in designing an 
authoritative procedure whose point it is to settle that very issue’.19 In order to avoid begging the 
question, we have to bracket substantive views about rights when deciding how such rights are to 
be determined. 
While Waldon does not state this explicitly, I suggest that the point of such bracketing is 
to allow all citizens to view themselves as members of a self-governing polity. Designing the 
decision-making process so as to privilege a particular conception of rights would effectively 
preclude those who hold different views from being full participants in that process.20 The process 
would appear rigged against them from the outset. It is only if we set substantive questions aside 
when selecting decision-making procedures that we will enable decision-making to be seen as the 
collective action of the political community as a whole, notwithstanding their differences in 
opinion. 
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This challenge is more demanding than simply creating a fair decision-making process. 
There is, for example, nothing unfair about a procedure that selects outcomes at random, but 
random selection is not a process of collective action. And there may well be other decision-
making processes which are not unfair but which are nevertheless defective in that they do not 
allow us to understand the political process as a truly collective endeavor. 
The basic role of the CoP, then, is to detach certain issues from questions of substantive 
political morality. Political political theory rests on the belief that a self-governing political 
community must exercise ‘distinctively political virtues’21 to deal with political disagreements. To 
invoke the CoP is essentially to invoke this idea. 
II. What Makes a Disagreement Political? Publicity, Collective Action and 
the Constitutional Architecture 
Perhaps surprisingly, Waldron is not explicit about what it means for a disagreement to be political. 
He states that disagreement in the CoP is ‘among the members of a certain group’ concerning ‘a 
common framework, decision or course of action’,22 and that the group in question must be a 
‘political body’23 and a ‘community’.24 But he does not really expand on these comments. In this 
section I examine the question of what makes a disagreement political in nature, laying the 
groundwork for the analysis of the particular arguments in which Waldron invokes the CoP. 
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The disagreement in the CoP is practical political disagreement. ‘Practical’ disagreement 
signifies that the disagreement concerns what ought to be done in a particular situation, in contrast 
with ‘theoretical’ political disagreement about principles of political morality or the nature of an 
ideally just society.25 While practical political disagreement on a particular matter will often reflect 
more abstract theoretical disagreement, the two types of disagreement are distinct.26 With 
theoretical disagreement, the wisest course of action is often to ‘agree to disagree’, that is, to let 
the disagreement lie without agreeing upon any common position. Practical disagreements cannot 
be dealt with in this way: they give rise to the CoP because they give rise to the need for a decision. 
We can distinguish between practical disagreement and conflict. Disagreement does not 
exist simply because different people propose incompatible courses of action. The fact that we 
each intend to take the last biscuit does not constitute a disagreement. Disagreement entails that 
we share some normative concept and diverge over its proper application. We only disagree if we 
each think that we ought to take the last biscuit, have a right to the last biscuit, or something 
similar. Conflict may arise as a result of clashes of interests in the absence of any disagreement.  
Not all practical disagreements are political disagreements: to distinguish the latter, we 
need a specific account of the distinctive nature of politics. Waldron’s statement that the relevant 
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disagreements are ‘among the members of a certain group’, and concern ‘a common framework, 
decision or course of action’27 is over-inclusive: it would include, say, a disagreement between 
members of a cricket team about the order in which they should go in to bat. Waldron’s various 
discussions of the CoP lack a detailed account of politics. But a sense of what such an account 
would include can be gleaned from another passage, where Waldron discusses the political theory 
of Hannah Arendt: 
The central case of an Arendtian zoon politikon is a person who engages seriously and 
responsibly in public business under the auspices of public institutions. He has the 
judgment to discern which issues are political and which are merely social or personal. He 
can see that what matter in politics are interests and purposes that are shared by all as 
members of a community.28 
Politics is thus the conduct of ‘public business’, through ‘public institutions’. Political matters are 
not ‘merely social or personal’: they are ‘shared by all’, or more properly, all citizens, by virtue of 
their status ‘as members of a community’. 
To develop this, we can say that it is only when members of a group see themselves as a 
public that the group will be capable of having truly political disagreements. This sense of 
publicness has three interrelated respects. Firstly, politics concerns affairs which are public as 
opposed to private: political matters are by their very nature everybody’s business (or at least every 
citizen’s business). Secondly, politics are the affairs of the public: political decisions should not 
be made for the benefit of some individual or group’s personal interest (in politics, salus populi 
suprema lex esto). Thirdly, politics concerns public action: political disagreements are about not 
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what you or I or anyone else should do as private individuals, but about what we should do as a 
polity. 
Politics thus provides conceptual space for a certain type of disagreement. The notion that 
certain matters engage a set of distinctively public considerations – what we might call the ‘sphere 
of the political’ – provides a common reference point that allows clashes between individuals and 
groups to emerge as genuine disagreements rather than mere conflicts. It creates a mode of 
commonality that transcends personal affective bonds and adherence to any shared creed, and 
allows opposed parties – even those characterized by trenchant and bitter rivalry – to view 
themselves as arguing about a shared interest to which they are all in principle committed. 
We can thus see how the ability to have practical political disagreements can itself be 
viewed as a significant achievement. Such disagreement can only take place where there exists a 
political community: a group of people that conceives of itself as having certain public affairs that 
are to be dealt with collectively. This collective self-conception requires a ‘public sphere’ – a 
shared space in which members of society can discuss matters of common concern – and it requires 
people to come to political debates willing to continue to resolve issues collectively. In turn this 
relies upon felicitous social conditions and needs to be maintained by an appropriate set of political 
and social institutions. There is thus a significant disanalogy between the CoP and the 
circumstances of justice: while the circumstances of justice are simply facts about the world that 
the theorist of justice must accept, the CoP only holds under demanding conditions which we have 
good reason to promote and defend. Justice does not demand that the circumstances of justice be 
preserved, but politics ought to strive to maintain the CoP. 
This perspective reveals an important facet of those political institutions that are the 
subject-matter of political political theory: they embed ideas about the nature of politics and the 
 
 
polity into our shared practices. A narrow focus on the practical problems raised by disagreement 
might tempt one to think of political institutions as simply decision-making mechanisms, taking 
some set of ‘inputs’ (political beliefs and preferences) and converting them into ‘outputs’ (political 
decisions). Rawls, for example, has said: ‘We may think of the political process as a machine 
which makes social decisions when the views of representatives and their constituents are fed into 
it.’29 But political institutions also play a more fundamental role. The institutional structure colors 
society’s sense of the boundaries of the political, be they topical (does politics extend to the 
regulation of commercial arrangements between consenting adults?), territorial (are ‘we’ the 
people of Scotland, of the UK, of Europe?) or what we might call the limits of political possibility 
(is it feasible to expect politics to effectively govern the conduct of multinational corporations?). 
The nature of politics – conceived of as a form of public collective action – is structured by the 
constitutional architecture.30 As we shall see, a number of Waldron’s arguments rely upon a 
recognition of the way in which political institutions serve to frame collective political action as 
such. 
To recap: the disagreements in the CoP are practical political disagreements, which means 
disagreements about what actions should be taken collectively by a political community in the 
pursuance of its public affairs. This requires a shared sense of publicness that is maintained in part 
by the constitutional architecture that helps to shape a political community’s understanding of 
itself. As we shall see below, this ‘framing’ role of political institutions needs to be borne in mind 
when considering the merits of competing constitutional systems. 
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III. The Authority of Law: Expressive not Instrumental 
One of the most basic arguments in which Waldron refers to the CoP holds that the fact of 
disagreement provides us with a reason to respect the authority of law. Since disagreement renders 
collective action a fragile achievement, the argument goes, collective decisions are worthy of 
respect.31 Put this way, legal authority seems to rest fairly straightforwardly on the value of 
expressing a commitment to the political community’s collective self-government. However, 
Waldron muddies the waters by conflating the status of the law as the product of collective action 
with the law’s capacity to co-ordinate behavior in the face of practical disagreement.32 
Waldron seems to envisage acceptance of the authority of law as effecting both a shift to a 
collective point of view and (consequently) the resolution of disagreement.33 On this picture, the 
law consists of shared standards which we agree to accept so as to resolve the problem of 
disagreement. Law thus takes us from the CoP to shared acceptance of a common position (a 
situation I shall call ‘legal agreement’). Here the resolution of disagreement runs concurrently with 
the shift from considering the issue on the basis of one’s individual opinion about justice to 
accepting a collectively-determined position. I call this the shift from ‘I-thinking’ to ‘we-
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thinking’.34 On this way of understanding things, to adopt a collective viewpoint is eo ipso to 
overcome the problem presented by the fact of disagreement. 
Note, however, that the two components of legal agreement – the adoption of a collective 
viewpoint and the resolution of disagreement – can be separated. Most straightforwardly, we can 
agree without adopting a collective viewpoint: we might just happen to hold the same view (a 
situation I call ‘political consensus’). More significantly: we can accept a collective viewpoint 
without resolving our disagreement. The phenomenon of legal disagreement shows this to be the 
case. It is not at all rare for reasonable citizens to be in possession of all the relevant facts and yet 
still disagree over what the law requires. So even when we agree to set our personal convictions 
to one side and take up the collective viewpoint of the law, we still sometimes end up disagreeing 
about how we ought to proceed. 
Recognizing this leads to the more complex picture shown in Table 1: 
Table 1 
  
Column A: 
Disagreement 
 
 
Column B: 
Agreement 
 
Row I:     I-thinking 
 
 
Circumstances of politics 
 
Political consensus 
 
Row II:     We-thinking 
 
Legal disagreement 
 
Legal agreement 
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should be done collectively and (ii) determining the collective view about what should be done collectively. 
We might say that the former is an exercise in ‘applied political theory’, while the latter an exercise in 
‘applied political political theory’. 
 
 
 
 
I do not mean to deny a connection between the adoption of a collective viewpoint and the 
resolution of disagreement. Resolving disagreement might well be the motive that people have for 
adopting a collective viewpoint, and under normal circumstances we might expect the range of 
legal disagreement to be narrower than the range of political disagreement. The point is just that 
law does not necessarily entail the resolution of disagreement. What it does entail is a distinctive 
register – a first-person-plural point-of-view – in which we might agree or disagree. 
We can therefore see that it is not the resolution of disagreement that is really doing the 
work in Waldron’s argument for the authority of law. After all, the obligation to respect the law 
applies regardless of whether the law is clear: in circumstances of legal disagreement, citizens and 
officials must nevertheless attempt in good faith to do as the law requires. The authority of law is 
not grounded in its practical capacity to co-ordinate action in the face of disagreement, but rather 
in the way in which it entails a shift from I-thinking to we-thinking – that is, the fact that law 
represents the common point of view of the political community. 
This can be made clear by looking at the possibilities in Table 1. In the straightforward 
situation envisaged by Waldron, law moves us from a situation of political disagreement to legal 
agreement. Such a move, as Waldron points out, gives us a reason to respect the law. However, 
there are also cases in which we disagree about what the law is; since law’s authority continues to 
hold in such cases, we can see that the value of respect for law does not rely on the resolution of 
disagreement. Finally, a shift from thinking about things on the basis of our individual political 
opinions to thinking about things from the collective viewpoint of the law can in fact give rise to 
disagreement where there was previously agreement. This can be seen from Riggs v Palmer, in 
 
 
which the Court of Appeals of New York was divided over the question of whether a grandson 
who had murdered his grandfather could inherit under the latter’s will.35 The judges agreed that, 
were they to consider the matter on the basis of justice, they would conclude that the grandson 
ought not to inherit. They were thus in political consensus. Nevertheless, they disagreed about the 
law: adopting the collective viewpoint of the law moved them from political consensus to legal 
disagreement.36 But none of this suggests in any way that they were not, in making their decision, 
bound to attempt to ascertain the collective viewpoint of law rather than follow their individual 
political opinions. We can therefore see that the resolution of disagreement is not necessary for 
legal authority. The virtue of respect for law is engaged whenever we are called upon to follow the 
collective position of the political community, regardless of the existence of agreement or 
disagreement as to the demands of justice or the demands of law. 
The emphasis that Waldron places on the resolution of co-ordination problems might give 
the misleading impression that his argument is an instrumental one, i.e. that law is authoritative 
because it allows us to avoid the conflict that would ensue if each individual attempted directly to 
secure justice as he or she saw fit.37 However, once we recognize that the obligation to respect the 
law holds even when we disagree about what the law requires, we can see that the real argument 
is essentially expressive in nature: adhering to the law even when one disagrees substantively with 
its content is a way of affirming one’s commitment to the polity. While this claim is implicit in 
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Waldron’s reasoning, it is muffled by his emphasis on the practical problems presented by political 
disagreement. If I am right in this, then we only understand the argument for the authority of law 
if we bear in mind that the CoP comprise not only the fact of disagreement, but also a shared 
commitment to a form of political togetherness which is robust across such disagreement. 
IV. The Centrality of the Polity to Civility and Loyal Opposition 
We saw in the previous section that Waldron’s focus on disagreement threatens to obscure the 
crucial point that accepting the authority of the law is a way of affirming one’s commitment to the 
polity. Turning to Waldron’s accounts of the principles of civility and loyal opposition, a similar 
pattern emerges. The goal of these principles is to recognize those who disagree with a regime’s 
political decisions as nevertheless belonging to the political community; a narrow focus on the fact 
of disagreement might lead one to overlook this fact. Civility and loyal opposition help create and 
sustain an inclusive political community that is capable of being understood as the collective action 
of its members. Once more, the felt need for collective action is more fundamental than the fact of 
disagreement. 
Civility, for Waldron, does not mean moderating one’s views in the presence of others, but 
more basically remaining committed to political resolution of even the most deep-seated 
disagreements.38 This means being prepared to hear views that one feels profoundly wrong, 
distasteful even, and to respond without seeking to disengage. The essence of civility lies in not 
responding to one’s political opponents with: ‘I refuse to have anything to do with these people’.39 
                                                          
38 Jeremy Waldron, “Civility and Formality,” in Civility, Legality and Justice in America, ed. Austin Sarat 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 59. 
39 Ibid. 
 
 
The principle of loyal opposition goes further: it recognizes the presence of dissenting 
views not merely as legitimate, but as something to be actively embraced, worthy of an official  
constitutional role.40 Waldron praises the position of the Leader of the Opposition in the UK and 
other commonwealth constitutions for projecting the idea ‘that criticism is OK and that policies 
are to be presented and defended in an explicitly and officially sanctioned adversarial 
environment’.41 The principle of loyal opposition provides constitutional recognition of the fact 
that we welcome profound and passionate disagreement between citizens over political matters. 
While there are instrumental reasons for civility and loyal opposition, the underlying 
motivation for these principles is expressive in nature: they rest upon the value of looking beyond 
one’s personal views about justice to recognize one’s political opponents as fellow members of 
the political community. Waldron makes the point in his discussion of civility: 
If there is such a thing as civic friendship defined as an affirmative relation among those – 
all of those – who inhabit the same polity, it has to be defined in a way that transcends 
affection, that transcends ideological hostility, and that transcends the differences that 
make us largely unintelligible to one another.42 
Civility provides the mode of interaction appropriate for expressing such a relationship; it is (as its 
etymology suggests) the distinctive virtue governing interactions between citizens. By treating our 
political opponents civilly we recognize that – while we may think them naïve or callous or bigoted 
or perhaps just downright stupid – they are nevertheless fellow-citizens. Civility, then, is not 
simply about paying acknowledgment to disagreement, as if disagreement in itself were something 
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worthy of respect. It is about recognizing something that we have in common notwithstanding our 
disagreements: we, fellow citizens, are all equal members of the political community.43 
The idea of expressing political togetherness through the recognition of disagreement is 
also the rationale of loyal opposition – indeed, the phrase ‘loyal opposition’ perfectly encapsulates 
the apparently paradoxical nature of this idea. That we nowadays do not equate opposition with 
disloyalty is the result of the tectonic shifts in our understanding of politics that took place in the 
early modern period: our ability to see things in this way is a significant achievement. We should 
not be complacent here: history shows that the conceptual space between opposition and disloyalty 
is prone to collapse under pressure.44 Constitutionally embedding the principle of loyal opposition 
provides our fragile achievement with expressive nourishment and the ongoing success of the 
principle is an example of the potent symbolic force of constitutional structures. 
As Waldron recognizes, the idea of ‘loyal’ opposition raises the question: ‘loyal to 
what?’.45 He considers what he takes to be five unsuccessful attempts at an answer – loyalty to the 
Queen, the Constitution, ‘constitutional essentials’, ‘the rules of the game’ and the nation – before 
concluding that it is ‘probably a mistake to distract ourselves’ with the question.46 Instead he argues 
that ‘the word “loyal” in “loyal opposition”… indicates the way in which the opposition party must 
be regarded in a constitutional system… their loyalty is not to be questioned but is to be 
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assumed’.47 But while that might be a sound political precept, the question ‘loyal to what?’ 
nevertheless persists, at least as a philosophical puzzle. 
Waldron ought to have identified the relevant locus of loyalty as the polity. This is a 
possibility he does not consider, or, if he does, he wrongly conflates with loyalty to the nation. He 
dismisses the suggestion that the nation could be the locus of loyalty by pointing out that 
‘opposition parties can be secessionist or anti-Unionist – as with Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland, 
Parti Québecois in Canada, or the Scottish National Party in the United Kingdom’.48 But while 
these parties are clearly not loyal to the nation in the sense of supporting the idea of a unified 
British/Canadian people, they have, in different ways and with varied degrees of enthusiasm, 
demonstrated acceptance of the legitimacy of the relevant polity. 
Consider: the Bloc Québécois49 and the SNP have declined to use their presence in the 
Canadian and British legislatures to disrupt parliamentary business and have adopted principled 
policies on Canada/UK-wide issues.50 Sinn Fein, by contrast, does not allow its candidates to take 
their seats in Westminster, but does participate in Northern Ireland (as well as Republic of Ireland) 
politics. Sinn Fein does not accept the legitimacy of the UK polity and so, so far as UK politics is 
concerned, is not a party of loyal opposition. The (admittedly faltering) success of the Good Friday 
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Agreement is down to its ability to construct a Northern Irish polity to which Sinn Fein as well as 
unionist parties can be loyal, albeit for different reasons.51 
It should be clear here that ‘loyalty to the polity’ does not mean an open-ended commitment 
to maintaining the political community in its present form, but simply an acceptance of its current 
legitimacy and a commitment to engage with its politics. The Bloc Québécois and the SNP view 
Canada and the UK as polities that are each comprised of a union of nations, and while they favor 
secession from this union they do not question its political legitimacy. Sinn Fein, on the other 
hand, do not accept the legitimacy of the UK, but they accept Northern Ireland as a polity whose 
members collectively have the right to determine their own political future.52 
The notion of the polity is therefore crucial for a proper grasp of Waldron’s insights about 
civility and loyal opposition. Through engaging with political opponents civilly, individual 
citizens affirm that they accept their opponents as members of the political community. The 
principle of loyal opposition projects the same message institutionally. It is this link to the polity 
that distinguishes civility and loyal opposition from the simpler idea of mutual forbearance or 
‘live-and-let-live’. The latter is a purely private notion in which strangers agree to leave one 
another alone. Civility and loyal opposition, on the other hand, are ‘distinctively political virtues’53 
that involve citizens recognizing one another as co-participants in a shared political practice. 
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V. Framing Collective Action: The Expressive Value of the Legislative 
Assembly 
A significant portion of Waldron’s oeuvre has been dedicated to articulating the ‘dignity of 
legislation’.54 Despite his strong commitment to political equality, Waldron does not view 
legislation by representative assembly as a compromise to the practical unfeasibility of 
government by plebiscite, but believes that ‘representation, rather than direct participatory choice, 
is the better democratic alternative’.55 Waldron’s preference for representation is, I suggest, 
attributable to a recognition that democracy demands a decision-making process that not only 
affords fair weight to the views of each citizen (a consideration that on its own would seem to 
support majoritarianism), but which also can be understood as a form of joint action undertaken 
by all citizens. The legislative assembly performs what I called above the ‘framing’ role of the 
constitutional architecture: it embeds into political life a shared sense of politics as a process of 
collective self-government. 
While the justification of majority-voting is based on the need to treat citizens fairly, the 
defense of legislation by assembly is grounded in a thesis about how politics can come to be 
understood as essentially a collective project. Waldron draws an analogy between legislation and 
the generation of customary law: in both cases law is generated not simply by the act of some 
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authoritative will, but by pooling experience and judgment. Legislation and custom are thus based 
on an ‘ascending’ rather than a ‘descending’ theory of authority:56 
In case of both statute and custom, the basis of legal authority has to do with a process 
(formal or informal) that brings together the plural and disparate experiences and opinions 
of those who are going to have to live with the norm in question.57 
This process enables individuals to identify with statutes as ‘their laws and the basis of the law’s 
legitimacy [as] their understanding and their acceptance of the place the laws… occupy in their 
way of life’.58 Thus the legislative process is possessed with an expressive value that is lacking 
from presidential/monarchical lawmaking and plebiscites (which, at least in modern nation-states, 
do not bring the people together for deliberation). Legislative processes are particularly suited to 
expressing a sense that the law is a kind of common property, rooted in an idea of the common 
good, rather than an imposition of dictates from on high. The point is not that this process will 
eventually give rise to a consensus, but that parties to ongoing disputes will see themselves as a 
community engaged in a joint project of self-government, rather than rival factions uneasily 
sharing the same piece of land. The legislative assembly plays a key role in structuring society’s 
understanding of politics: it embodies the idea that, despite our differences of opinion, clashes of 
personal interest, etc., we remain united in our commitment to the project of governing ourselves 
collectively. 
VI. A Lapse into Majoritarianism: The Core of the Case Against Judicial 
Review 
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In this section I highlight the perils of reducing issues of constitutional design to the question of 
how to deal fairly with disagreement. In his ‘core case’ article,59 Waldron takes a lopsided 
approach to the CoP, focusing excessively on the fact of disagreement and consequently neglecting 
the need for political decisions to be understood as the outcome of collective action. This leads 
him to overlook the role of constitutional design in framing society’s understanding of the political 
process, leaving us with a disappointingly thin line of reasoning – premised on a somewhat 
simplistic majoritarian conception of democracy – which fails to do justice to the insights that 
Waldron presents elsewhere. 
Waldron presents the question of whether judicial review is anti-democratic as resting on 
the balance of ‘outcome-related’ and ‘process-related’ reasons.60 The outcome-related reasons 
include worries that legislatures might be swayed into violating rights by virtue of popular pressure 
and concerns that courts are prevented from engaging moral questions directly by their focus on 
constitutional texts and judicial precedents.61 Taken together, Waldron judges the outcome-related 
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reasons ‘inconclusive’.62 The core case against judicial review therefore turns on Waldron’s 
process-related argument. 
Although Waldron does not use the phrase ‘circumstances of politics’ here, his process-
related argument depicts a scenario that is essentially a formulation of the CoP: a citizen (whom 
Waldron calls ‘Cn’) disagrees with a political decision and asks why she should nevertheless 
‘accept, comply, or put up with it’.63 Cn asks two questions: (i) why was the decision left to be 
determined by this particular group of decision-makers? and (ii) why did this group use the 
particular decision-rule that they did?64 
Legislatures, Waldron argues, are able to provide reasonably convincing answers to these 
two questions.65 Firstly, their members were chosen by an election in which Cn was able to 
participate on equal terms with her fellow citizens. Secondly, the use of majority-decision within 
the legislature provides: ‘a reasonable approximation of the use of [majority-decision] as a 
decision-procedure among the citizenry as a whole’.66 Accordingly, the legislative process 
provides ‘each person the greatest say possible compatible with an equal say for each of the 
others.’67 
If, on the other hand, the decision has been made not by a legislature but by a court, then, 
Waldron says, there are no satisfactory answers to Cn’s two questions.68 For the first question, 
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Waldron argues that there is no process-related justification for the make-up of the court’s bench, 
because judges are not chosen by the electorate. For the second question, there is no moral basis 
for the court’s adoption of majority-decision in order to resolve disagreement between the justices. 
Majority-decision ‘is appropriate for persons who have a moral claim to insist on being regarded 
as equals in some decision-process’,69 but there is no reason why this should be so among the 
judges. While legislatures can point to their representative role as the source of their claim to an 
equally-weighted vote, the use of majority-decision among judges appears arbitrary. He concludes 
that the process-related reasons support legislative decision-making and that this amounts to a 
strong case against judicial review, under normal circumstances.70 
Now to say that the electoral and legislative processes provide a ‘reasonable 
approximation’ of a vote of the citizenry as a whole is to beg a rather obvious question: why should 
we be satisfied with an approximation? Why not hold a plebiscite? On Waldron’s own argument 
it seems that this would have been more respectful to Cn, who may quite reasonably ask why her 
opinion should be given so little weight in comparison to the opinions of the legislators. We have 
already seen how Waldron would want to respond to this challenge: while a plebiscite succeeds in 
affording fair weight to the views of each individual, the process of legislation by a representative 
assembly is superior insofar as it can enable citizens to view political decisions as the outcomes of 
the collective action of the political community as a whole.71 However, the logic of the ‘core case’ 
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argument does not leave any space for this response. The way in which the constitutional 
architecture frames a society’s politics is neither an ‘outcome-related’ nor a ‘process-related’ 
consideration: it speaks to neither the substantive quality of decision-making nor the fairness with 
which the process treats individuals like Cn. In the ‘core case’ article Waldron, malgré lui, treats 
the constitutional structure as merely a ‘machine which makes social decisions’,72 thereby 
sidelining the issue of how legislative and judicial decision-making might differ in the way in 
which they cause disagreements to be framed. 
The problem here lies in Waldron’s attempt to answer a general question about the relative 
merits of two constitutional systems from the viewpoint of a particular citizen who disagrees with 
a particular decision. Putting the question into the mouth of Cn presupposes that the decision in 
issue has already been politically framed and, more generally, that Cn and her fellow citizens are 
able to identify themselves as members of a legitimate polity that decides questions like this 
through a process of collective action.73 Waldron thereby treats the framing of the issue in hand, 
and indeed the very make-up of the polity, as parameters that are independent of the question of 
constitutional design. And yet, as Waldron’s defense of legislation itself shows, the constitutional 
architecture plays a crucial role in helping to define the nature of the political community, as well 
as affecting the framing of particular political questions. So in taking as his starting-point Cn’s 
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objection to a particular decision, Waldron treats as fixed what are in fact dependent variables. 
This mistake leads him to overstate the significance of arithmetical political equality. By ignoring 
the question of how a constitutional system is able to promote the sense that all citizens are part of 
a collectively-acting political community, he is able to reduce the task of constitutional design to 
that of ensuring fair treatment of competing opinions.74 
Once we recognize the framing role of the constitutional structure, we cannot focus solely 
on the way in which the legislature can integrate citizens into a cohesive political community, we 
must also consider whether judicial review might also possess similar value. Relevant arguments 
can be made either way. Perhaps legislative supremacy is superior because it reinforces a sense 
that the political community’s most fundamental principles are to be determined in a forum which 
brings together members of all groups within that community.75 Perhaps judicial review is superior 
because institutionalising the principle that political decisions must be justifiable to each individual 
expresses respect for all citizens.76 No doubt many other arguments could be made. My point is 
that, by adopting a methodology that overlooks considerations about how constitutional systems 
frame our understanding of the nature of politics, Waldron effectively excludes these kinds of 
argument altogether. 
These difficulties with Waldron’s ‘core case’ show the risk of focusing on the fact of 
disagreement and failing to pay adequate attention to the need for decisions to be made through 
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collective action. Focusing narrowly on disagreement, we see the need to treat each individual’s 
point-of-view equally, and are thus led to commend majoritarian decision-making procedures. We 
must remember, however, that we cannot build a polity solely on the basis of a fair treatment of 
conflicting opinions; there must be a shared commitment to resolve disagreements collectively. A 
constitution needs to promote and maintain a shared understanding between citizens that political 
decisions flow from their own collective action. To debate issues of constitutional design as if the 
only concern were to resolve disagreement fairly is to overlook the role that political institutions 
play in constituting the political community at such. 
VII. Conclusion: The Circumstances of Politics and Politics (or, Political 
Political Theory and the Political) 
Waldron’s presentation of the CoP as analogous to the circumstances of justice achieves its basic 
purpose of highlighting the fact that, to enable citizens to view themselves as members of a self-
governing political community, we must put our substantive views about political morality to one 
side when thinking about constitutional questions and the duties we owe to one another as citizens. 
However, our study has revealed a significant disanalogy between Waldron’s concept and its 
Humean forebear. While the circumstances of justice are facts that the philosopher of justice must 
simply accept, the CoP represents a condition which is worthy of being defended. In respecting 
the law and treating fellow citizens civilly, we express a commitment to the polity; similarly, the 
value of loyal opposition and legislation by assembly lies in their capacity to allow ideological 
opponents to view themselves as nevertheless members of the same political community. Each of 
Waldron’s arguments assumes that the political condition, in which conflicts can manifest 
themselves as disagreements over how to pursue a common interest, is worth preserving. 
 
 
We must thus understand the political condition as an achievement as well as a predicament 
– something that the ‘circumstances of politics’ label perhaps obscures. This comes to the fore 
when we encounter challenges that do not take the form of political disagreements, but are instead 
threats to the very idea of politics. I have in mind two very different kinds of challenge. One is 
motivated by a view that politics is merely a struggle between competing interest-holders intent 
on rent-seeking. Denying the value (and perhaps even the intelligibility) of collective action, 
neoliberalism promises a utopia in which market competition replaces political decision-making 
as the key force regulating society.77 The other challenge rejects the inherent contestability of 
politics. In place of the quintessentially political ideal of unity in diversity, populism seeks to 
establish a sense of collective action understood as the pursuit by a homogeneous people of a 
‘singular, unambiguous mandate’.78 These challenges each threaten to undermine our capacity to 
have political disagreements: neoliberalism by presenting political convictions as mere cover for 
the pursuit of individual interests; populism by characterizing dissent as the work of outsiders, 
traitors, or a corrupt elite. 
How politics can defend itself against the neoliberal Scylla and the populist Charybdis is a 
question beyond the scope of this article. However, attention to Waldron’s use of the CoP reveals 
something that will be an important feature of any such response: the capacity of political virtues, 
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practices and institutions to express commitment to the idea of politics as a form of valuable 
collective action that permits persisting disagreement. If the political sphere is to be protected, we 
must be attentive to its need for such symbolic nourishment. Our political institutions must both 
provide recognition of our disagreements and nurture the shared sense that in politics we are 
pursuing a common good through our collective action. 
